COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING
AND
POST-CONFLICT POLICE REFORM

Technology Implementation Guides

D 3.8

Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Department of International Environment and Development Studies

Deliverable 3.8:
Technology implementation guide

In fulfillment of Deliverable 3.8, a "Technology implementation guide" is included for Kenya and Guatemala, the two focus countries where SIMLab expects to be able to carry out pilot projects. Although SIMLab has grant funding to conduct "pilot initiatives," based on the contextual analyses, this is only possible to do with high quality in two of the eleven focus countries. For the remaining nine countries, please refer to the line of inquiry on "Implementing environment" included in Deliverable 3.2, which considers both the constraints of implementation, as well as active organizations or precedent initiatives that have utilized community-facing communications strategies or ICTs for community empowerment or community safety. This line of inquiry is included as a means to understand how ICTs might best be leveraged in the future to strengthen the communications and relations between community members and police in the face of violence, conflict, or risk.

In the following, SIMLab outlines a general implementation guide to be used for the planning and implementation of an ongoing pilot project in Turkana County, Kenya, and for a possible pilot project to take place in Guatemala. As SIMLab continues to prepare, design, and implement these two pilot initiatives, this process will be carefully documented and shared. In addition to overall documentation, the pilot will be monitored and evaluated to determine replicability within and without the country context, as well as potential improvements to the model. Implementation guides for the remaining countries will then be drafted based on lessons gained from the first two pilot initiatives in Kenya and Guatemala, and updated and shared with the consortium by 30 November 2018, with Deliverable 3.9 (Documenting community adoption, Operational Sustainability and Transferring Findings) and 3.10 (Knowledge-based system for COP), the remainder of SIMLab's ICT4COP deliverables.

Based primarily on the SIMLab Context Analysis Methodology, the following guide offers a background into how SIMLab, researchers, or other project partners could engage with a potential pilot project in a given focus country. Much like the research reflected in the other WP3 deliverables, such as 3.2, 3.7, and 3.8, the SIMLab Technology implementation guide included here follows along six key areas of interest, or lines of inquiry, that help to understand the context in which a potential project or pilot initiative might take place. These six lines of inquiry include: the people directly and indirectly targeted by the project; the community

and culture in which they live; the market and technology environment; the political economy; the implementing organization or implementing environment; and the project parameters themselves.

The general guide outlines the stages of the research, preparation, and eventual implementation that might be most relevant to determining contextually specific engagement and technology strategies to strengthen police and community relations and improve human security. While technology is always under consideration, the guide also reflects the "low connectivity" nature of the environments in which this research and project engagement is being carried out. As such, the guide offers approaches that build on existing communications, rather than indiscriminately inserting new technologies where they may not be sustainably adopted by project partners or community members.

Table of Contents

Technology implementation guide: Overview

Stage I: Desk Research

- Gather data on the lines of inquiry reflected above. (Desk research examples included in Deliverable 3.2 for each of the 11 focus countries). This includes data on indicators such as **poverty, ethnicity, literacy, and education levels**, all of which impact the extent to which individuals can reliably access and use technologies, in addition to impacting their vulnerability to security risks.
- Examine common **communication channels and mobile penetration**. While indicators regarding use of mobile technologies or Internet are useful initial background, these are regarded with careful skepticism because of over-reporting in surveys and ownership of multiple devices or SIM cards by the same user, for example.
- Consider the market and political environment, considering policies regarding network operations, or community policing, security, and technology, including freedom of speech, **surveillance, and data security**.
- Include information from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with thematic experts, academics, or organizational leaders whenever possible.
- Identify **potential partner organizations** working in-country at the community level, whether local nonprofits or national or international NGOs, and enable researchers to make contacts for site visits and interviews.

Stage II: Partner and project identification

- Wherever possible, partner identification and negotiations should be conducted together with ICT4COP research colleagues (see below) so that the pilot project can build on existing research and create the best possible chance of the researchers being able to benefit from and participate in the pilot project.
- Where this is not possible, SIMLab's networks should be utilized to recruit and interview potential partners conducting relevant projects in the region, as it is preferable to layer on top of existing projects rather than start a new one – to build on the ICT and community engagement strength of that project and observe the results. This also allows the project to demonstrate the distinction between COP projects alone, and well-designed tech-enabled COP projects.
- Partnerships and projects emerging from this research must follow international ethical standards and lie within the ethical guidelines of the ICT4COP project, and allow SIMLab to act at all times in accordance with its principles, include in Annex A.

Stage III: Context Analysis Fieldwork

- The context analysis fieldwork requires direct engagement with **Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews** in country over the course of 7-14 days. Ideally this takes place in urban and rural areas, as well as areas with and without prior examples of community oriented policing, in order to offer a comparison between sites.
  - o Because **urban and rural areas** have markedly different access to ICTs and distinct security challenges, a community-specific focus is needed to prepare for project design.
- FGDs focus on the **context in which people access ICTs**, considering levels of familiarity with technologies, and how ICTs of all kinds are used to communicate with one another, their government, and security providers, including police, to get information about news, risks, or conflict.
  - o Careful consideration of the **experiences of vulnerable groups**, such as youth, elderly, or women, and how they may navigate ICTs differently, and have particular safety concerns.
  - o Careful consideration of the **perceived trustworthiness and reliability of communications channels** generally, as well as for reporting or communicating with security providers specifically.
- Fieldwork should include significant time spent with partners to conduct partner scoping and analysis of the implementing environment and pilot project parameters. This will include assessing the **technology capabilities at an organization level,** including:
  - o Effective access to necessary infrastructure, including electricity, internet, and mobile signal
  - o Support of innovation and tolerance of risk at the leadership level
  - o Technological literacy and time commitment among staff and partners
- The fieldwork may also include participant observation of the in-country context, assessing indicators such as **mobile and mobile data usage, costliness of technology use, and network reliability and interoperability.**

Stage IV: Project Preparation and Design

- While the context analysis in the prior stage is seen as preparation for project design, this does not cover design explicitly. Following the context analysis, the next stage will require following up with potential partners to confirm interest and project feasibility.
- At this stage, identification of **applicable and inclusive technologies** to the specific context should begin, taking care to reflect the findings from the context analysis fieldwork. Inclusive technologies typically include:
  - o Simple mobile-enabled websites
  - o Phone-based web-enabled messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal
  - o Text messaging and Interactive Voice Response (IVR) platforms
  - o Radio

- o   Print media
- o   Noticeboards and feedback boxes
- o   Town criers and local stores
- In a co-design process with partners, the **technology tool selection process** should consider the technologies above and any others that might be appropriate in the setting, and how best to build on existing communications and create strategies that are inclusive to the focus community members.
- This stage should also feature the initiation of **monitoring and evaluation (M&E)**, by documenting the theory of change, and key outcomes, outputs and activities that build to the overall project goal.
- Key qualitative and quantitative indicators should be defined and a baseline study carried out or planned.
- Regular monitoring must be put in place to ensure regular data collection throughout the pilot. This monitoring must include feedback from the target population and the means to communicate with them about the outcome of feedback given.

Stage V: Project Implementation

- In conjunction with **local partners**, the team should carry out a workplan over a set period of time, relying on **existing technologies** and introducing any new tools identified as applicable and feasible in the above tool selection process.
- Throughout project implementation, the process will require **consistent reevaluation** and reworking of the project plan as needed based on reliability of the technologies, threat levels, or other environmental conditions.
- The implementation process will also require **careful documentation** of the steps taken in order to ensure proper **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)** and eventual dissemination of findings and lessons learned.

Stage VI: Monitoring and Evaluation

- Based on the M&E framework set out in the project design phase, **regular monitoring** should be combined near the end of the project with an **evaluation or review**, which may be carried out by an independent third party. The evaluation compares the initial theory of change and plan, and the execution of the project against set criteria agreed at the inception of the evaluation (which may be early in the project). Interviews, data collection, analysis of monitoring data and other means may be used to gather information for the evaluation.

Stage VII: Disseminating Learning and Findings

- Following the pilot project's conclusion, the team should ensure that lessons learned and findings from the project implementation are shared in a variety of accessible formats.

- Per SIMLab's approach, **evaluation reports should be publicly shared** in their totality and in machine-readable formats, including shorter, more accessible summaries.
- The SIMLab team and any partners should be facilitated to conduct a **retrospective exercise** to gather feedback and lessons learned about project management, communications and other issues less germane to the achievement of the project's goal, but still useful in understanding best practice in "Tech for COP."

A note about the research: in the case of the ICT4COP project, SIMLab is joined in the consortium by teams of researchers, with distinct responsibility for regions and countries. Wherever possible the country researcher and their Work Package colleagues should be involved in setting up and planning the pilot, and encouraged to use the opportunity to gather data and conduct research about the impact and practice of ICT for COP projects. Wherever possible, consortium research should also inform the pilot itself. The researchers could also accompany SIMLab on set-up and monitoring and evaluation trips, and participate as a member of the evaluation team.

Technology implementation guide: Country summaries

In the following descriptions, SIMLab uses the above implementation guide to consider the overall implementing environment in Kenya and Guatemala. The summaries below outline the challenges related to security as well as access to ICTs of all kinds, in order to understand how inclusive technologies can best be leveraged in these difficult, low-connectivity environments. This is then followed by a summary of possible implementation tools, in order to offer a sense of the technologies and communications strategies available for strengthening community police engagement. These are technologies that might be appropriate for a pilot initiative, or for partner organizations to consider for future engagements. Each summary concludes with an outline of next steps moving forward, and a brief reflection on the overall expected challenges related to engagement in each country context. As the pilot planning process continues, SIMLab will then complete the above implementation guide for each country with context specific findings and design decisions.

Technology implementation guide: Kenya

Brief assessment of implementing environment

As of May 2017, SIMLab's pilot project in Kenya's Turkana County is underway, made possible in part through a partnership with Handicap International (HI), an international NGO, and two local partner organizations in the region, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) and the Justice and Peace Center (JPC). The aim of the pilot project is to contribute to the reduction of the risk and incidence of armed violence among affected communities living in the counties of Trans Nzoia, Turkana, and West Pokot. More specifically, the pilot will work to strengthen an existing "Early Warning System (EWS)" operated by FPFK, that works with local community "surveyors" to share messages regarding potential threats or violent incidents, in an effort to improve the regional response to violence and conflict. In these remote communities, violence takes the form of ethnic conflict over limited resources or encroaching drought, particularly in the run-up to the country's elections in August 2017. With changing climate conditions and frequent drought, these populations have seen increasingly high poverty levels, estimated at 94% of the population in Turkana County, for example.[1]

To offer a bit of context, it bears noting that overall, the Kenyan police are commonly characterized by limited resources, poor training, and slow response times, in addition to corruption or brutality in some communities.[2] As recently as 2014, research by Transparency International found the National Police Service to have an 81% corruption score, making it the country's most corruption-prone public institution.[3] In turn, police reform has been an ongoing challenge for several decades, emerging with multi-party democracy in the 1990s in Kenya.[4] Police reform saw renewed focus following the violence following the 2007 elections, during which the police were frequently identified as aggressors of violence and fatalities.[5] Under the Constitutional reforms in 2010 the National Police Service (NPS) was established, bringing together the Kenya Police and the Administration Police under one independent commanding office.[6]

---

[1] Siringi, S. (2013). Kajiado richest and Turkana poorest in new county ranking. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kajiado-richest-county-Turkana-poorest-/1064-1930892-q2ypfwz/index.html

[2] Mageka, A. (2015). Police reform in Kenya: challenges and opportunities. *Security Sector Reform Resource Centre*. Retrieved from: https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/10/09/police-reform-in-kenya-challenges-and-opportunities/

[3] Mageka, A. (2015).

[4] Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR). (2014). Are we under siege? The state of security in Kenya. *KNHCR.* Retrieved from http://www.ke.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Democratic%20Governance/State%20of%20Security%20in%20Kenya%20-Occassional%20Report.pdf

[5] ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). (2010). Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in Kenya. ICTJ. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Security-Reform-2010-English.pdf

[6] KNHCR (2014). (69).

In Turkana County, police are notoriously resource limited, however, and given the sheer distances required to reach remote communities, and the protocol requiring officers or police substations to get approval prior to responding to emergency situations, police response time is limited and often delayed. Given this, and some lingering reluctance to communicate directly with the police, communities often rely on other security providers or stakeholders in times of emergency or threat. In a report on policing in peripheral counties in Kenya, researchers from the Small Arms Survey succinctly note, "Turkana is a challenge to administrators due to its remoteness and poor infrastructure…weak governance and the absence of security have compounded the poor security picture."[7] As it relates to conflict and security enforcement specifically, there is a generally perceived "absence of government."[8] In the ongoing pilot project, the aim will be to better prepare community members to engage with security actors of all kinds, mainly focused on local and international NGOs, in addition to local county government and police control stations.

With regard to the market environment, although the country overall has a mobile penetration rate exceeding 80%, Turkana and surrounding counties are far removed from network development, with interior areas "off the grid." Only 2% of the population on average has access to electricity. In addition to this extremely limited access to ICTs of any kind, some estimates state that only 18% of Turkana County residents can read and write,[9] while only 3% of the population is reported to have a secondary education or above,[10] thus greatly limiting the population's ability to access written communications of any kind, including mobile phone interfaces or complicated SMS messaging, for example. Rather, the context analysis included in Deliverable 3.3 instead indicates that given minimal electrification, poverty levels, and low literacy, communities in the region tend to rely primarily on face-to-face communication as a means to gain information or share news about risks or violent incidents.

Possible implementation tools

For the purposes of the pilot project in Kenya, SIMLab will focus its efforts on improving the overall functionality of an Early Warning System (EWS), run by local organizations FPFK and supported by HI and JPC as partners. Currently, the EWS relies on SMS messaging as the primary ICT, connecting designated, anonymous community "surveyors" to a local "control center" that receives coded messages regarding potential threats of conflict or violence across the three counties. These

---

[7] Mkutu, K. and Wandera, G. (2013). Policing the Periphery Opportunities and Challenges for Kenya Police Reserves. *Small Arms Survey*. Retrieved from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP15-Kenya-Policing-the-Periphery.pdf

[8] Steinhublova, T. (2016). Community security in Kenya's frontiers. *Security Sector Reform Resource Centre (SSRRC)*. Retrieved from https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2016/01/22/publication-summary-community-security-in-kenyas-frontiers/

[9] CRA (Commission on Revenue Allocation). (2011). Kenya County Fact Sheets. CRA. Retrieved from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-1335471959878/Kenya_County_Fact_Sheets_Dec2011.pdf

[10] KNBS (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics) and SID (School of International Development). (2013). Exploring Kenya's Inequality: Pulling apart or pooling together? Turkana County. KNBS and SID. Retrieved from: http://inequalities.sidint.net/kenya/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/Turkana.pdf

messages are then forwarded on to appropriate actors, including the police, with the expectation that actors will respond appropriately to potential threats or reported incidents. The pilot implementation will primarily focus on the existing EWS by working to add and expand on technical features of the "ActiveXpert SMS system," including increased reporting, higher quality reporting, and higher incidences of response to reports by actors.

From a technical perspective, this will potentially include more frequent trainings for surveyors on how to safely use their phones to maintain anonymity, upgrades to the phones (and networks) currently used by community surveyors to improve reliability of messaging, access to backup batteries or solar chargers, acquiring a dual-SIM telephone to create redundancy in the system when the electrical power running the EWS goes out, creating automatic replies or message forwarding to make the system less reliant on human operation, and expanding the scope of the ongoing data analysis on the incident reports received and the responses that take place, enabling more strategic responses to violence or potential conflict.

From a project management perspective, this will also involve strengthening the coordination between stakeholders in the EWS, and increasing the relevance, quality and frequency of trainings and learning resources to help the system run more efficiently. This focus on coordination will also include more frequent meetings and workshops to bring actors together, and encourage organizations who receive warnings from the EWS to contribute input on new indicators to be included in the data analysis, and to create action plans based on trends identified in the data analysis.

Next steps and challenges

Through the work of a SIMLab Project Director based in Washington, D.C. and a Project Manager based in Kitale, Kenya, the pilot is expected to run for a minimum time period of May – December 2017, coinciding with Kenya's presidential elections in August 2017, around which an uptick in ethnic violence is expected in the region. Immediate next steps will include the hiring of a local Kenya staff person, who will have significant project management and technical responsibilities, reflected in the possible implementation tools outlined above. This will then be followed by the initiation of a joint work plan with the national and local partners listed above, expected in early June 2017.

As the pilot builds on an already existing communications system, the project aims to address a number of existing challenges with the system, identified by project partners and SIMLab. Consistent connectivity remains an issue in the region, and the EWS will continue to be challenged by poor network access for surveyors, the high costs of mobile airtime, the costs of electricity and charging, or electrical outages that may disrupt service. And while the system itself is technical, it nonetheless relies heavily on the effective and efficient participation of local organizations, staff, and volunteers. For the EWS to become a more effective tool will require greater commitment and institutionalization. This will require involvement from organizations that are willing to consistently respond to reports of risks or violence, including the country government and the police, more funding to

ensure that the EWS is staffed by salaried rather than volunteer technicians, and funding to create more opportunities for trainings and meetings among the volunteer surveyors participating tin the EWS program. While these challenges are partially beyond the scope of the pilot project, they will nonetheless help to frame SIMLab's engagement, and the findings from the pilot will be documented in an effort to demonstrate the existing strengths of the EWS, the improvements that take place over the course of the pilot, and the potential ways the EWS can continue to be leveraged and made more sustainable over time.

Technology implementation guide: Guatemala

Brief assessment of implementing environment

Guatemala's struggles with pervasive gang networks and high levels of gang violence are a familiar story in Central America's "Northern Triangle" of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Though Guatemala's gang violence has earned the country notoriety on the global stage, efforts to address government corruption and judicial impunity through the United Nations International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, known as the CICIG, have been met with national and international acclaim, offering hope for increasing access to justice in the country. Nonetheless, police reform has been met with significant challenges, even after formal separation of the police from the country's military following the end to the country's civil war in the mid-1990s.

In spite of high levels of violence experienced by Guatemalans on a day-to-day basis, the reporting of crimes to the police remains low, indicating a clear challenge with perceptions of police responsibility or accountability. As seen in many other countries in the ICT4COP research, police-community relations is greatly challenged by low levels of trust in the police, owed largely to their prominent role in the human rights abuses perpetrated during the country's decades-long dictatorship. In urban communities, the community-police relationship is more challenged because of the strength of gang territories. It bears noting that security providers in Guatemala range from the police (PNC) to the military police (provided by the army), as well as significant private security hired by businesses and private citizens. Reporting indicates that victims opt out of reporting for a host of reasons, whether for fear of retribution, perceptions of impunity, or lack of knowledge about the process, among other possible explanations. This is particularly true in the case of crimes against women, where one in three women report experiencing physical or sexual violence,[11] and femicide, meaning the killing of women or girls, has the lowest of all conviction rates in the country.[12] Victimization and homicide rates are also high for youth, leaving the country's young people particularly vulnerable. It also bears noting that violence and crime are not uniform across the country, and urban areas, typically with higher levels of non-indigenous populations, tend to see higher levels of violence, particularly in the form of extortion by gangs, while rural areas, with higher concentrations of indigenous populations, may experience higher levels of domestic violence, and violence against community control in the form of encroachment of private lands and resources.

With regard to the country's market environment, Guatemala has seen similar growth in mobile penetration as compared to levels in Central and Latin America.

---

[11] UNDP (2014). Violence against women ever experienced (%). *UNDP.* Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/146106

[12] Mathema, S. (2016, February 24). They are refugees: an increasing number of people are fleeing violence in the Northern Triangle. *Center for American Progress*. Retrieved from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016/02/24/131645/they-are-refugees-an-increasing-number-of-people-are-fleeing-violence-in-the-northern-triangle/

With a mobile penetration rate estimated at 121 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants as of July 2015, with approximately 82.4% of households reporting having access to a cellular telephone.[13] These rates are higher in urban areas, with 91.6% of households in metropolitan urban areas having access, as compared to 75.1% in rural areas.[14] While the market has expanded and seen the introduction of 4G coverage, for example, Guatemalans still rely on a number of other technologies to gain access to news and information. For example, 72.4% of households have a radio,[15] and an estimated 63.2% report getting current events primarily from television.[16] And even as these numbers point to large populations with access to mobile devices and information on a regular basis, these rates are consistently higher among urban, non-indigenous populations, and gaps in affordability and accessibility of ICTs remains a significant challenge across the country.

Guatemala is a fairly unequal society, with concentrations of wealth among the elite and large swaths of the population living below the poverty line, and particularly when compared to nearby El Salvador and Nicaragua, Guatemala's population has a much larger population identifying as indigenous. Many indigenous Guatemalans, living in rural areas, have lower levels of literacy than the overall Guatemalan population, and may speak languages such as Mayan as a first language, rather than Spanish. Low literacy, combined with lower levels of schooling and income for indigenous populations than the national average, access to information and technologies is likely to be significantly lower for a large portion of the Guatemalan population. Literacy rates are also consistently lower for women, thus indicating a need to carefully consider how women engage with ICTs and gain access to information.

Possible implementation tools

While SIMLab has not yet had the opportunity to conduct fieldwork or a context analysis (four examples of which are included in Deliverable 3.3) the following summary offers possible implementation tools that could be considered as work in Guatemala moves forward. Eventual fieldwork is expected to take place in Villa Nueva, in Guatemala City, an urban site, and in Sololá, a rural site.

Given the limited use of technologies among lower income communities, indigenous groups, and those living in rural areas, implementation tools may be best targeted for community members who already work in a community engagement capacity, such as staff at local women's shelters or with women' groups. This would require a strategic capacity building of key workers, rather than community members at

---

[13] CIA World Factbook (2017, January 12). Guatemala. Retrieved from:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html
[14] Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (2015). Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos 2-2014. *INE*. Retrieved from:
http://www.ine.gob.gt/sistema/uploads/2015/07/22/YXFVZe0cIfRDUPYuNwuVak3gjNsF8g2w.pdf
[15] ITU. (2016). *Core household indicators.* Retrieved from http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
[16] Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2016). Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 2014. *INE*. Retrieved from
http://www.ine.gob.gt/sistema/uploads/2016/02/03/bWC7f6t7aSbEI4wmuExoNR0oScpSHKyB.pdf

large, or training community leaders to act as advocates or reporters. In terms of communications, this might include designating "central nodes," such as organizations or literate individuals who are able to use telephones or computers with ease, receive messages from police and community members, and serve as community liaisons, bridging the accountability and technological gap that frequently exists. Although this may be complicated in areas with significant gang control or violence, this is one possible approach to reach more vulnerable, disconnected populations.

Given the rampant insecurity and gang violence across the country, any community level initiative will need to be considerate of accountability and anonymity, in order to ensure that community members feel assured of their personal safety when participating in a new program or pilot. As such, it may be advisable to rule out anything that might put people directly at risk, such as reporting crime directly, or via mechanisms susceptible to gang interception. Therefore, tools could instead be police-focused, or focused on police and other security providers.

Overall, any tool will need to build on existing and appropriate mechanisms. This might include community meetings or other public fora, creating confidential feedback mechanisms such as feedback boxes in secure locations, or public information campaigns in key languages that are regionally appropriate, and not just limited to Spanish. Rather than focus exclusively on "new media" in the form of digital or social media, campaigns might make use of popular and existing forms of media, such as television and radio stations and newspapers, with expert contributions from police or security experts, or regular columns or segments regarding security, in an effort to encourage community conversation and awareness around risks and violence. In areas where vernacular radio is common, recorded segments can be created and distributed for transmission by smaller community stations that are typically very receptive to new, additional content. For example, radio programming might include radio "plays," where content is dramatized through a narrative format, and optionally, community members can call or text in to the station to "vote" on programming (including plot twists and decisions by key characters) for the following week.

Next steps and challenges

In order to move forward with a potential pilot in Guatemala, an immediate next step will be to conduct a context analysis in the fieldwork sites of Villa Nueva, Guatemala City, and Sololá, in addition to other areas identified by SIMLab researchers or ICT4COP researchers as potential areas for engagement. In addition to the standard lines of inquiry that SIMLab utilizes to understand community level access to information and technologies, particularly in the context of human security, the context analysis will also help to understand community priorities for strengthening community police relations. A first aim will be to understand the drivers behind why community members choose not to report threats, crimes, or violence, and to identify the most appropriate mechanisms for communicating with police, security providers, or local organizations or NGOs that can operate as intermediaries.

This will involve engaging with potential partner organizations, including community-based organizations, NGOs, and the police, to understand their key communications goals as it relates to human security and community oriented policing. For the police, for example, goals might include general public awareness regarding rights and responsibilities, public campaigns promoting police responsibility and trustworthiness, or strengthening accountability mechanisms for individual police officers or the police force on the whole.

This may build on the ongoing work of the CICIG, the highly regarded International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. If an identified goal is community engagement more broadly, this might include building on existing community meetings, and strengthening accountability systems that may be limited in their current application. Generally, fieldwork will be critical in helping to identify where existing reporting or communications mechanisms are already in place and considering how technology might be strategically used to leverage their impact, while always considering how to keep these methods secure from gang interception or other forms of surveillance, that could ultimately have a chilling effect on public participation.

Overall, the scale of inequality and lack of access to ICTs and illiteracy in rural areas, and fear of gang reprisals in urban areas, will make this a challenging place to work. As such, it will be critical to identify optimal sites for pilot engagement. These are places where partner organizations are committed to the rule of law, and actively working to stem corruption and reprisals, like that seen in urban Villa Nueva.

References

References: Guatemala

CIA World Factbook. (2017, January 12). Guatemala. *CIA*. Retrieved from:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html

Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (2015). Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos 2-2014. *INE*. Retrieved from
http://www.ine.gob.gt/sistema/uploads/2015/07/22/YXFVZe0cIfRDUPYuNwuVak3gj NsF8g2w.pdf

ITU. (2016). *Core household indicators. ITU*. Retrieved from
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx

Mathema, S. (2016, February 24). They are refugees: an increasing number of people are fleeing violence in the Northern Triangle. *Center for American Progress*. Retrieved from
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016/02/24/131645/t hey-are-refugees-an-increasing-number-of-people-are-fleeing-violence-in-the-northern-triangle/

UNDP (2014). Violence against women ever experienced (%). *UNDP.* Retrieved from:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/146106

References: Kenya

Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP). (2013). Turkana County. *ASDSP*. Retrieved from: http://www.asdsp.co.ke/index.php/turkana-county

CRA (Commission on Revenue Allocation). (2011). Kenya County Fact Sheets. CRA. Retrieved from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-1335471959878/Kenya_County_Fact_Sheets_Dec2011.pdf

ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). (2010). Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in Kenya. ICTJ. Retrieved from:
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Security-Reform-2010-English.pdf

KNBS (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics) and SID (School of International Development). (2013). Exploring Kenya's Inequality: Pulling apart or pooling together? Turkana County. KNBS and SID. Retrieved from:
http://inequalities.sidint.net/kenya/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/Turkana.pdf

Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR). (2014). Are we under siege? The state of security in Kenya. *KNHCR.* Retrieved from http://www.ke.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Democratic%20Governance/State%20of%20Security%20in%20Kenya%20-Occassional%20Report.pdf

Mageka, A. (2015). Police reform in Kenya: challenges and opportunities. *Security Sector Reform Resource Centre*. Retrieved from: https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/10/09/police-reform-in-kenya-challenges-and-opportunities/

Mkutu, K. and Wandera, G. (2013). Policing the Periphery Opportunities and Challenges for Kenya Police Reserves. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP15-Kenya-Policing-the-Periphery.pdf

Siringi, S. (2013). Kajiado richest and Turkana poorest in new county ranking. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kajiado-richest-county-Turkana-poorest-/1064-1930892-q2ypfwz/index.html

Steinhublova, T. (2016). Community security in Kenya's frontiers. *Security Sector Reform Resource Centre (SSRRC)*. Retrieved from https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2016/01/22/publication-summary-community-security-in-kenyas-frontiers/

Annex A: SIMLab's Organizational Principles

Do No Harm

> 'The wellbeing of the people we are trying to help must be the focus of our efforts to help them. In other words, the cure must not be worse than the disease and the intervention must not destroy (or harm) that which it is meant to help. Wellbeing is not some brief thing that exists only in the moment we offer assistance. It is not a photograph of a school or a rebuilt house or a successful surgery or of feeding a child. Adhering to the principle of "do no harm" demands that we consider their wellbeing apart from and beyond our intervention.'
>
> *- From Principle To Practice, A User's Guide to Do No Harm - CDA Learning Projects*

Bear Witness

We will engage with relevant partners, persons, or organizations to call attention to and attempt to change programs and activities that harm, exclude, or marginalize people. To the extent that doing so will not cause more harm, we will be public and open about our efforts to effect change, and will consider withdrawing from an engagement if those efforts fail.

Build inclusion

We will prioritize including marginalized and vulnerable populations in the systems and services we contribute to, regardless of cost. We believe that doing otherwise builds harmful, discriminatory systems, and we will not participate in any engagement that 'prices out' marginalized or vulnerable populations.

Be context-sensitive

We will build projects from a thorough understanding of the local context and systems, and avoid bringing preconceived solutions to new problems. We will push for changing the fundamentals of a project if it is a poor fit for the contextual reality, and we will structure partnerships that allow for this agility. We will exit any engagement that we feel is inappropriate for the context, or that violates our principles. We will evaluate projects on how they address the core challenges of the context, rather than through a purely technology-grounded lens.

Design for sustainability and ownership by local implementers

We will design projects with clear plans for their sustainable operation, replication, horizontal scaling, or exit without substantial further resources from outside their implementing organization and context.

Foster accountability and participation

We will build systems that foster mutual accountability between communities, donors, and clients, and we will foster that same mutual accountability in SIMLab's relationships with partners and staff. To the greatest extent possible, we will build human-centered systems that encourage local participation in, ownership of, and control of problem identification and solutions. We will collect, use, manage and destroy data ethically, and prioritize protecting vulnerable populations when collecting, managing, and disposing of data.

Encourage ecosystems of collaboration and openness

Where appropriate, we encourage the use of existing tools and platforms that are open, interoperable, and well-maintained, so that communities are not beholden to an inflexible custom toolset and data is free to move between platforms. We advocate for this approach among donors and partners in the field.

Succeed, fail and learn in public

We prioritize learning, and developing best practices and advocacy from our work and the work of others. Our learning is public and openly licensed. We develop our learning to apply across sectors and specialisms. We will share resources in accessible and inclusive formats, using simple, clear language, and translate them where we can. We will share our successes and our failures, and apply learning to recommendations for institutional change.